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Abstract 
This paper suggests a dynamic measure of intentional herding, causing the excess volatility or 
even systemic risk in financial markets, which is based on a new concept of cumulative returns 
in the same direction as well as the collective behavior of all investors towards the market 
consensus. Differing from existing measures, the measure allows us to directly detect time-
varying and market-wide intentional herding using the model of Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
(DCC) (Engle, 2002) between the financial market and its components that is partially free of 
spurious herding due to the inclusion of the variables of the number of economic news 
announcements as a proxy of market information. Strong evidence in favor of the dynamic 
measure over the other measures is based on empirical application in the U.S. markets (DJIA and 
S&P100), supporting the tendency to exhibit time-varying intentional herding. Much more 
important is a finding that the impact of intentional herding on market volatility tends to be 
stronger during the periods of turbulent markets like the degradation of U.S. sovereign credit 
rating by S&P, and be more significant in S&P 100 than DJIA.  
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
In financial markets herd behavior is the process that market participants are imitating each 
other’s action and base their decisions upon the decisions or actions of others (Avery and Zemsky, 
1998; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999). Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) classify herding into spurious 
herding and intentional herding. When investors react with the same well known public 
information and make the same investment decisions, it can be regarded as a spurious herding. 
Whereas, if investors have an intention to follow the behavior of others, it can be regarded as an 
intentional herding. Although it is not easy to precisely distinguish intentional herding from 
spurious herding, it is a meaningful challenge because the distinction seems to be so essential to 
prevent erroneous analyses (Walter and Weber, 2006) and more crucially intentional herding 
might lead to systematic risk, bubble phenomenon, and asymmetric volatility in financial markets 
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Kodres and Pristsker, 1998; Park, 2011).  
Although there are abundant measures for detecting herd behavior (Lakonishok et al., 1992; 
Christie and Huang, 1995; Chang et al., 2000; Sias, 2004; Patterson and Sharma, 2005), most of 
the empirical studies do not investigate whether their results are attributes to spurious or 
intentional herding. Only a few of the literatures tried to distinguish intentional from spurious 
herding. Hwang and Salmon (2004) and Blasco and Ferreruela (2008) tried to distinguish between 
spurious and intentional herding based on the ideas of the cross-sectional variance of beta and 
comparison of the cross-sectional standard deviation (CSSD) of returns in markets with it in the 
artificially created market, respectively. However, these two methods do not control for price 
movements induced from public information, so that it is hard to tell whether herding towards the 
market consensus is intentional.  
In sharp contrast to prior herding research, we propose a methodological approach for 
dynamically detecting the intentional herding towards the market consensus, which has 
substantial improvement in three dimensions: Firstly, we share the same intuition as in Nofsinger 
and Sias (1999) that herding appears to result in return momentum. In this vein, to capture the 
herding intensity intrinsically, we introduce cumulative returns in the same direction, instead of 
returns, that is likely to be related to persistency and intensity of return autocorrelation due to herd 
behavior (feedback trading or momentum). Secondly, we collect the number of economic news 
announcements as a proxy of market information that is likely to induce agents react together, and 
like the assertion of Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000), consider it as spurious herding in response 
to new market information. Especially, we employ the method of Mitchell and Mulherin (1992) 
to collect the number of news announcement. The intuition underlying this method is that greater 
number of news announcements relates primarily to more information faced by market 
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participants. Unlike earlier studies, our method can directly control information driven (spurious) 
herd behavior by using information proxy. Thirdly, herd behavior might be detected by evaluating 
co-movement of stock returns with the measure of conditional correlations in returns volatilities 
(Boyer et al., 2006) in that herding tendency of uninformed investors towards the market 
consensus leads to co-movement of stock returns. Having this intuition１, we propose a new and 
time-varying measure for intentional herd behavior using the estimation of the Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation (DCC) multivariate GARCH model (Engle, 2002). That is, given the 
variables of cumulative returns in the same direction and the number of economic news 
announcements, we specify the model of DCC between the financial market and its components, 
and estimate DCC as the intensity of intentional herding toward the market, which is closely 
related to co-movement of the components under the control for the impact of economic news２. 
Based on the measure of time-varying intentional herding, we suggest the test statistic of 
intentional herding at time t under the null hypothesis of no intentional herding. 
To investigate the reliability of our methodology for detecting market-wide intentional herding, 
we apply it to the two main U.S. stock market indices: Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and 
Standard and Poor’s 100(S&P 100), and estimate the effect of dynamic intentional herding on 
market volatility by quantile regression estimation (Koenker, 2005) that is a valid alternative to 
OLS estimation for reflecting how the effect of intentional herding on market volatility changes 
across different market conditions. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the methodological details, 
Section 3 presents the data description such as U.S. market indices (DJIA, S&P 100), and their 
components, sample periods, number of U.S. economic news and their sources. In Section 4, we 
construct the models to estimate new herding measure and implement tests for intentional herding, 
and show empirical evidence on dynamics of intentional herding. Finally, in Section 5 we 
summarize key contributions of this study and interpret the empirical results. 
 
Ⅱ. Framework and Methodology 
                                           
１ In addition, this intuition is consistent with Devenow and Welch (1996) who consider herding as 
behavior patterns being correlated across investors in markets.   
２ Intuitively, even if intentional herding toward market index must give rise to co-movement in the stock 
returns of the components, the reverse might not be necessarily true due to the effect of spurious herding. 
In our model, however the increase of DCC estimates is directly linked to intentional herding because the 
effect of spurious herding can be largely removed by the variables of the number of economic news 
announcements. Furthermore, King et al. (1994) and Karolyi and Stulz (1996) insist that, contrary to 
volatility, conditional correlations tend to be insensitive to macroeconomic news.      
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1. Cumulative returns in the same direction 
In this study, cumulative returns in the same direction is the first considerable factor of herd 
behavior. It reflects the persistency and intensity of return autocorrelation toward the same 
direction as a source of herd behavior. Chen (2013) argues that herd behavior can be described as 
an investment strategy to follow the market consensus. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) also insist that 
herd behavior is a phenomenon that group of participant trade to the same direction during the 
same time. Therefore, if market participants trade to the same direction with market consensus 
during same periods, autocorrelation of market index returns will be positively stronger with the 
direction of trading and it will also be lasted same direction for a fairly long time.  
Several studies have focused on the relationship between return autocorrelation and trading 
behavior, especially positive feedback trading strategy as a special case of herding. Positive 
feedback traders base their decision on the price movement positively. That is, "Buy High, Sell 
Low". Thus, it makes positive return autocorrelation with respect to the previous price and it 
makes potential for mispricing and excess volatility (Sentana and Wadhwani, 1992; Campbell et 
al., 1993; Barclay and Warner, 1993; Sias and Starks, 1997; Cooper, 1999; Koutmos and Saidi, 
2001). However, simple return autocorrelation cannot represent exactly the herd behavior because 
return autocorrelation may be occurred not only herd behavior but also sequential information 
arrival.  
In this viewpoint, Patterson and Sharma (2005) propose the PS measure for intraday level data 
using bootstrapped runs test which is based on the information cascade models of Bikhchandani 
et al. (1992). They classify that if the current trade price is higher than previous trade price(up-
tick), it is ‘buyer-initiated’ and if current trade price is lower than previous trade price(down-tick), 
it is ‘seller-initiated’ and, if there is no change, it is ‘zero-tick’. The key idea is that if investors 
herd, real number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated sequences will be lower than expected 
number of sequences (1/3 each) on day t. 
We propose a new concept to capture the persistency and intensity of return autocorrelation 
toward the same direction as a significant source of herd behavior. We call it ‘cumulative returns 
in the same direction (crs)’, which is obtained by the following two steps: in first step, we set the 
number of runs toward the same direction 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 as a persistency of return autocorrelation in the 
same direction. 
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if  𝑟𝑖,1 ≠ 0,                       𝑇𝑖,1 = 1           
if  𝑟𝑖,𝑡 > 0 {
and   𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 ≤ 0,    𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 1       
and   𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 > 0,    𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1
if  𝑟𝑖,𝑡 < 0 {
and  𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 ≥ 0,     𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = −1      
and   𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0,    𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 − 1
if  𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 0,                        𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 0           
       (Eq. 1) 
where, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  is observed returns on stock i at time t
３ . Thus, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡  denotes how long the 
autocorrelation toward the same direction is lasted in stock i. For example, if 𝑇𝑖,𝑡= 2, all of the 
observed returns are greater than zero during 2 days, on the other hand, if 𝑇𝑖,𝑡= -10, all of the 
observed returns are lower than zero during 10 days. Therefore, if |𝑇𝑖,𝑡| is relatively high, it 
means the greater probability of herd behavior. [Figure 1] shows the calculated 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 in DJIA and 
S&P 100 returns from January 4th, 2010 to May 31st, 2013. 
 
[Figure 1] 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 of DJIA (upper) and S&P 100(lower) 
 
 
In second step, to catch both the intensity and persistency of return autocorrelation, we should 
                                           
３ Let 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 be the price of stock i at time t and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = ln (𝑝𝑖,𝑡/𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1). 
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combine the ideas of cumulative returns and 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 simultaneously. If the return sequences lasted 
toward the same direction for a long time, cumulative returns in the same direction (𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡) at time 
t gets rather bigger than observed returns at time t. Hence, it is defined as follows: 
𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐼(𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ≠ 0)𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑇𝑖,𝑡) [∏ (1 + |𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑗+1|) − 1
|𝑇𝑖,𝑡|
𝑗=1 ] + 𝐼(𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 0)𝑟𝑖,𝑡   (Eq. 2) 
where 𝐼(∙) is an indicator function and 𝑠𝑔𝑛(∙) is a sign function. For example, in [Table 1], if 
we observe 5% returns during 4 days each, cumulative return at last forth day is 21.55% because 
(1.05)4 − 1 = 0.2155. Cumulative returns toward the same direction are only calculated in the 
range of sequence of 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is in the same direction. 
 
[Table 1] Key idea of cumulative returns in same direction (crs)  
 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 
Observed returns 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Cumulative returns 0.05 0.1025 0.1576 0.2155 
 
[Figure 2] Returns and cumulative returns in same direction of DJIA (upper) and  
S&P 100(lower) (Unit: percent) 
 
 
Therefore, the persistency and intensity of return autocorrelation toward the same direction as a 
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returns of DJIA and S&P 100 and the right panels of [Figure 2] show the cumulative returns in 
same direction of DJIA and S&P100. In [Figure 2], the movements of the cumulative return series 
support the view that, as expected, the cumulative return series are more highly dynamic and 
include the more extreme values compared with the return series. On the nature of the cumulative 
return series, this additional volatility should be attributed to the herding caused by the momentum 
strategy for investment. Moreover, the cumulative return series also tend to be clustered together 
over time and this might be related to a repeating pattern in which herding is concentrated at an 
irregular point in time and disappears immediately afterwards. 
 
2. The Number of Economic News as a Proxy of Market Information 
According to Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000), if investors react with the same well known 
public information and make the same investment decisions, it can be regarded as spurious 
herding. In contrast, if investors have an intention to follow the others’ behavior, it can be 
regarded as intentional herding. That is, intentional herding is purely imitative actions with 
neglecting their own private information.  
Since any type of herding is not observable directly, there is no apparent criterion that 
distinguishes intentional herding from spurious herding and only a few studies made an attempt 
to do it. Especially, both Hwang and Salmon (2004) and Blasco and Ferreruela (2008) tried to 
distinguish them using the ideas of cross-sectional variance of beta and comparison between 
CSSD and artificially created CSSD, respectively. However, these two methodologies have 
limitation in classifying the intentional herd behavior because they do not directly control the 
impact of public information. Thus, there is the question of how to control it. In this context, we 
use the number of economic news announcement as a proxy of market information to account for 
the information driven herding (i.e. spurious herding) and can more accurately classify intentional 
herding.  
Several empirical studies have reported that New York Times front-page headlines, the number 
of daily Dow Jones or the Wall Street Journal stories and dividend announcements are closely 
related to regularities in financial markets or market activities (Penman, 1987; Thompson et al., 
1987; Atkins and Basu, 1991; Berry and Howe, 1994; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1994). We collected 
the number of economic news announcements by Dow Jones Institutional News and The Wall 
Street Journal using Dow Jones FACTIVA news repository service. Unlike previous studies, we 
consider only well categorized economic news such as Commodity/Financial Market News, 
Corporate/Industrial News, Economic News. [Figure 3] shows the positive relationship between 
|DJIA returns| and the number of news, which is log-transformed and linearly detrended. This 
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visual impression can also be confirmed by the estimation of the correlation. Pearson’s correlation 
test results indicate that the correlation coefficient between |DJIA returns| and the number of news 
is 0.1965(p-value=0) and it increases to 0.5336(p-value=0.0604) when the |DJIA returns| is 
greater than 3%. Similarly, the correlation coefficient between |S&P 100 returns| and the number 
of news is 0.1891(p-value=0) and it increases to 0.5903(p-value=0.0030) when the |S&P 100 
returns| is greater than 3%. This implies that the positive relationship is nonlinearly significant. 
 
[Figure 3] Relationship between absolute value of returns and the number of news 
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3. Cross-sectional DCC between market and its components 
Literature on herd behavior in market index has mainly focused on two streams. The first 
stream is nearly linked to the existence of herd behavior by monitoring the stock returns 
dispersions between market index price and its components. The most commonly used empirical 
methodologies are suggested by Christie and Huang (1995) for CSSD and Chang, et al. (2000) 
for CSAD (henceforth referred as CH and CCK respectively). They argue that if market 
participants herd, returns in index components won’t deviate far from the market index returns 
and thus return dispersions should be relatively low. Many of the studies have employed CSSD 
and CSAD method to capture the herd behavior in the U.S. market as well as international markets 
(Demirer and Kutan, 2006 and Tan et al., 2008 for Chinese stock market; Chiang et al., 2010 for 
global markets; Enonomou et al., 2011 for south European markets).  
 
[Figure 4] Relationship between CSSD/CSAD and DJIA/S&P 100 returns 
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herding in Japan, and the significant evidence of herding for South Korea and Taiwan. 
[Figure 4] shows the relationship between CSSD (left side) / CSAD (right side) and daily DJIA 
returns(upper) and S&P 100 returns(lower) during sample period. Horizontal full line denotes 5% 
quantile of CSSD / CSAD and dotted line denotes 1% quantile of CSSD / CSAD. According to 
CH and CCK, herd behavior occurs during periods of extreme fluctuation of asset returns and the 
presence of herd behavior in the financial market should make CSSD and CSAD relatively low. 
In [Figure 4], however, the relation between CSSD/CSAD and returns is opposite to the intuition, 
implying that CSSD and CSAD measure may not play a role in explaining the herd behavior 
during extreme fluctuation of asset returns. This failure is partially linked to some limitations of 
CH and CCK methods. First, Hwang and Salmon (2004) point out that simple cross-sectional 
dispersion of individual stock returns is not independent of time series volatility, but we find CH 
measure hard to capture herding dynamics in stock returns or market index returns. Second, CH 
essentially employs one fraction of the total return to capture herding toward the market consensus. 
In other words, it tests for one specific form of herding and ignores herding in other contexts. 
Third, Bohl, et. al. (2017) argue that their methods are particularly prone to be biased against 
finding evidence for herding and lead us to misinterpretation on herd behavior in markets. 
The second stream is nearly linked to the degree of co-movement. Dhaene, et. al. (2012) explain 
that the volatility of a stock market is determined by the higher positive interdependence in 
markets. Therefore, the stronger positive interdependence is a sign of less diversification and may 
cause extreme volatility of market index. Sylliganakis and Kouretas (2011) consider cross-
sectional DCC as the degree of co-movement. They examine the financial contagion effect on 
seven emerging stock markets of Central and Eastern Europe. They explain that during the period 
of the 2007-2009 stock crash, strong positive DCC coefficients are observed and it is an exact 
evidence of contagion effect due to herd behavior (see also Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Corsetti, 
Pericoli, and Sbracia, 2005; Boyer et al., 2006; Chiang et al., 2007; Jeon and Moffett, 2010).  
In this vein, we emphasize that cross-sectional DCC can more directly and intuitively explain 
the interdependence structure in a financial market resulting from herding toward the market (i.e., 
convergence of investors’ behaviors), implying that a high degree of herd behavior toward the 
market gives rise to strong conditional correlation between market index and its components as 
well as high market volatility. Consequently, we propose a new and dynamic measure for 
intentional herd behavior using the estimation of cross-sectional DCC model with the variables 
of the number of economic news announcements as a proxy of market information.  
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4. New dynamic measure and test for intentional herding 
As mentioned earlier, we derive the new intentional herding measure from combination of three 
methodologies: (1) To capture the market-wide herd behavior and its intensity in market index, 
we calculate the cumulative returns in the same direction which reflects the persistency and 
intensity of return autocorrelation caused by the momentum strategy. (2) We consider the number 
of economic news announcements by Dow Jones Institutional News and The Wall Street Journal 
as a proxy of market information to distinguish intentional herd behavior from spurious one. (3) 
Using the cumulative returns in the same direction and the number of economic news 
announcements, we estimate the cross-sectional DCC model across the market and extract an 
intensity of intentional herding in the market. In order to estimate cross-sectional DCC, we 
consider the ARMA (1,1)-DCC (1,1) multivariate GARCH (1,1) model. Mean equations can be 
defined as: 
𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑚,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑚 + 𝛿𝑚,1𝐷𝑁𝑚,𝑡
𝐺 +𝛿𝑚,2𝐷𝑁𝑚,𝑡
𝐵 + 𝜃𝑚,1𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑚,2𝜀𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 
𝑐𝑟𝑠1,𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜃1,1𝑐𝑟𝑠1,𝑡−1 + 𝜃1,2𝜀1,𝑡−1 + 𝜀1,𝑡 
⋮ 
𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖,2𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
⋮ 
𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑛,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑛 + 𝜃𝑛,1𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑛,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑛,2𝜀𝑛,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑛,𝑡                           (Eq. 3) 
In (Eq. 3), 𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑚,𝑡  is cumulative returns in the same direction of the market index (i.e., 
m=DJIA or S&P 100 index in this paper) and 𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡  is that of the ith component (stock) of 
market index (i=1, …, 30 for DJIA or i=1, …, 100 for S&P 100 index). 𝐷𝑁𝑚,𝑡
𝐺 (𝐷𝑁𝑚,𝑡
𝐵 ) is a 
dummy variable which takes value of 1, if 𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑚,𝑡 > 0(𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑚,𝑡 < 0) and the number of economic 
news announcements is greater than average number of news at time t. 𝜃𝑚,1(or 𝜃𝑖,1)  and 
𝜃𝑚,2(or 𝜃𝑖,2) are AR(1) and MA(1) coefficient respectively. 
Then, variance equations can be also defined as: 
ℎ𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑚 + 𝛼𝑚𝜀𝑚,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑚ℎ𝑚,𝑡−1 
ℎ1,𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛼1𝜀1,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽1ℎ1,𝑡−1 
⋮ 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 
⋮ 
ℎ𝑛,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑛 + 𝛼𝑛𝜀𝑛,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑛ℎ𝑛,𝑡−1                      (Eq. 4) 
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In (Eq. 4), ℎ𝑚,𝑡 is conditional variance of market cumulative returns in the same direction, 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is that of the i th component of market index, 𝜀𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡
1/2
𝑣𝑡, 𝑣𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) is residuals 
of the process, and 𝐻𝑡
1/2
 is (1 + 𝑁) × (1 + 𝑁) positive define matrix at time t. Conditional 
covariance matrix 𝐻𝑡 can be decomposed in DCC model (Engle, 2002) such that: 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡
1/2
𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡
1/2
                             (Eq. 5) 
where 𝐷𝑡
1/2
 is diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviation and 𝑅𝑡 is the positive define 
time-varying correlation matrix. That is,  
𝐷𝑡 =
[
 
 
 
ℎ1,𝑡 0
0 ℎ2,𝑡
  
 ⋯   0
 ⋯   0
  ⋮   ⋮
  0   0
 
  ⋱ ⋮
   ⋯ ℎ𝑛+1,𝑡]
 
 
 
 , 𝑅𝑡 =
[
 
 
 
   1   𝜌1,2,𝑡
  𝜌1,2,𝑡      1  
    
⋯ 𝜌1,𝑛+1,𝑡
⋯ 𝜌2,𝑛+1,𝑡
  ⋮      ⋮    
𝜌1,𝑛+1,𝑡 𝜌2,𝑛+1,𝑡
   
⋱   ⋮
⋯   1 ]
 
 
 
 
With the estimates of parameters in the DCC models, our measure of time-varying intentional 
herd behavior in a financial market is defined as: 
 𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡 =∑𝜔𝑖,𝑡𝜌𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
, 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑝𝑖,𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
               (Eq. 6) 
where 𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡 is dynamic herding measure, 𝜌𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 is DCC coefficient between market index m 
and the 𝑖𝑡ℎ component at time t, i=1, 2, ..., n, n is the total number of components, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 is 
weight of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ component at time t. 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are close price and outstanding shares of 
the 𝑖𝑡ℎ component stock at time t, respectively.  
Some studies (King et al., 1994; Karolyi and Stulz, 1996) show that conditional correlations 
tend to be insensitive to macroeconomic news and, as mentioned earlier, the impact of market 
information is directly controlled by the number of news announcement in the DCC model. That 
is, conditional correlations among cumulative returns of component stocks are primarily driven 
by intentional herding and change over time. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the 
measure captures market-wide intentional herding substantially as a function of conditional 
correlations and is time-varying by nature.   
According to the definition of the herding measure, 𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡  ranges from 0 to 1 and its mean 
is 0.5. Hence, the intensity of intentional herding in markets varies in degree based on the value 
of the herding measure. For example, high values indicate existence of significant intentional 
herding at time t, whereas low values indicate existence of insignificant intentional herding at 
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time t. Standardizing the intentional herding measure, eventually, we can derive the following test 
statistic of intentional herding at time t under the null hypothesis of no intentional herding. 
𝑍𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡 =
𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡 − 0.5
?̂?𝐷𝐻𝑚
                         (Eq. 7) 
where the test statistic 𝑍𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡  follows standard normal distribution and ?̂?𝐷𝐻𝑚 is the estimated 
standard deviation of 𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡 in the market. Following standard hypothesis test procedures, we 
perform the test for intentional herding with the null and alternative hypotheses: 
Null hypothesis 𝐻0 ∶ 𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡 ≤ 0.5 
Alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 ∶ 𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡 > 0.5 
and determine whether the null hypothesis of no intentional herding at time t is rejected.     
 
Ⅲ. Data Description 
1. U.S. market index and its components 
We consider the two main U.S. stock market indices: Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and 
Standard and Poor’s 100 (S&P 100) to investigate whether there has been significant herd 
behavior in U.S. stock markets. The sample period is from January 4th, 2010 to May 31st, 2013 
and it contains 858 trading days. DJIA index contains thirty U.S. companies and one of them was 
replaced during sample periods.４  Meanwhile, S&P 100 index contains one hundred U.S. 
companies and twelve of them were replaced during sample periods.５ Therefore, these changes 
are reflected in the stock return time series of index components. 
DJIA index is calculated by the arithmetic sum of the prices of all 30 individual stocks and 
divided by the divisor. That is, DJIA index = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 /𝑑. Where, 𝑝𝑖 is the price of stock i and 
                                           
４ On September 24, 2012, Kraft Foods (KFT) was replaced by United Health Group (UNH) by following 
Kraft Foods spinning off its snacks business into new Mondelez International Inc. (MDLZ). 
５ On February 13, 2010, Burlington Northern Railroad (BNI) was replaced by Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 
Class B (BRK.B). On March 31, 2011, Campbell Soup (CPB), NYSE Euronext (NYX), Regions Financial 
Corp. (RF) and Hillshire Brands Co. (HSH) were replaced by Apache Crop. (APA), Emerson Electric Co. 
(EMR), Union Pacific Co. (UNP), Visa Inc.(V). On March 30, 2012, Alcoa Inc. (AA), Avon Products Inc. 
(AVP), Entergy Corp. (ETR), Spring Nextel Corp. (S), Weyerhaeuser Co. (WY), Xerox Corp. (XRX) were 
replaced by Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (APC), Accenture Plc. (ACN), EBAY Inc. (EBAY), Eli Lilly and 
Co. (LLY), Starbucks Corp. (SBUX), Simon Property Group Inc. (SPG). On January 31, 2013, Dell Inc. 
(DELL) was replaced by AbbVie Inc. (ABBV). 
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d is Dow Divisor, N is total number of index components, thus N=30. So, DJIA index is only 
depends on its price of index components. Unlike DJIA, S&P 100 index follows the method of 
capitalization weighted. That is, S&𝑃 100 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = ∑ (𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)/𝑑
𝑁
𝑖=1   where 𝑝𝑖 is the price of 
stock i, 𝑞𝑖 is outstanding shares and d is divisor, N is total number of index components, here 
N=100. For reflecting the weights of index components with respect to S&P 100 index, we 
collected the shares outstanding data on iShares S&P 100 ETF website.６ [Figure 5] shows the 
DJIA index price (upper left), DJIA index returns (upper right), S&P 100 index price (lower left) 
and S&P 100 index returns (lower right) during sample periods. 
 
[Figure 5] Close price and returns, DJIA and S&P 100 
  
 
2. Economic News Announcements 
In order to collect the number of economic news announcements by Dow Jones Institutional 
News and The Wall Street Journal, we use Dow Jones FACTIVA news repository service.７ Dow 
Jones FACTIVA provides 48 major news and business publications in United States such as ABC, 
                                           
６ Source: www.ishares.com/us/products/239723/ishares-sp-100-etf 
７ Source: https://global.factiva.com 
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Barron’s, and The Washington Post. We consider all the companies and industries to consider 
market wide news. We choose three main subject options: Commodity and Financial Market news, 
Corporate and Industrial news, and Economic news. [Table 2] shows sources and subjects of the 
collected news. 
 
[Table 2] News summary: sources and subjects 
Source Dow Jones Institutional News, The Wall Street Journal 
Company All Companies 
Industry All Industries８ 
Subject Commodity/ Financial Market, Corporate/Industrial, Economic news 
Region United States 
 
[Table 3] Top 30 subjects of news announcements for January 04, 2010 
 Subject  Subject 
1 Derivative Securities 16 National Gov. Debt/Bond Markets 
2 Routine Market/Financial News 17 Treasury Bond Prices/Commentary 
3 Energy Prices 18 Foreign Exchange News 
4 Crude Oil Markets 19 Tables 
5 Crude Spot Market Commentary 20 Corporate Debt Instruments 
6 Commodity/Financial Market News 21 Debt/Bond Markets 
7 Commodity Markets 22 Central Bank Intervention 
8 Energy Markets 23 Acquisitions/Mergers/Takeovers 
9 Commentaries/Opinions 24 Regulation/Government Policy 
10 Interest Rates 25 Selection of Top Stories/Trends 
11 Economic News 26 Equity Markets 
12 Money Markets 27 Cash Commodities Commentaries 
13 Energy Commentary 28 Page-One Stories 
14 Crude Oil/Natural Gas Product 29 Industry Profile 
15 Analyst Comments/Recommendations 30 Equity Derivatives 
                                           
８ Dow Jones FACTIVA news archive provides 17 sub-categories for industry type: (1) Agriculture, (2) 
Automotive, (3) Basic Materials/Resources, (4) Business/Consumer Services, (5) Consumer Goods, (6) 
Energy, (7) Financial Services, (8) Health Care/Life Sciences, (9) Industrial Goods, (10) 
Leisure/Arts/Hospitality, (11) Media/Entertainment, (12) Real Estate/Construction, (13) Retail/Wholesale, 
(14) Technology, (15) Telecommunications, (16) Transportation/Shipping, (17) Utilities. 
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[Table 3] reports top 30 subjects of Dow Jones Institutional News and The Wall Street Journal 
News announcements for a sample day, January 4th, 2010. Total 123 news announcements were 
reported on this day and classified total 100 subjects. Top 30 subjects have 65% of news 
announcements in this sample day. [Table 4] shows the standard summary statistics for the 
number of news announcements. It is interesting to note that the number of Dow Jones 
Institutional News is on average lower than the number of the Wall Street Journal, but the standard 
deviation of Dow Jones Institutional News is greater than the Wall Street Journal. 
 
 [Table 4] Summary statistic: The number of news (2010. 01. 04 ~ 2013. 05. 31) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
Dow Jones Institutional News 66.0105 32.7505 0.1693 
The Wall Street Journal 84.9138 12.2853 -0.3073 
Total Number of News 150.9242 36.9273 0.0253 
 
The left side of [Figure 6] shows the total number of news announcements by Dow Jones 
Institutional News and The Wall Street Journal, and the right side shows linearly detrended total 
number of news. 
[Figure 6] Total number of news, linearly detrended 
  
Ⅳ. Empirical Evidence  
1. Estimating Intentional Herding and its Dynamics 
 We provide the estimation results of the ARMA (1,1)-DCC (1,1) multivariate GARCH (1,1) 
model (Eq.s 3 and 4) that are reported in [Table 5]. Parameters μ, 𝜃1, and 𝜃2 are intercept, AR 
(1), and MA (1) parameters of (Eq. 3) respectively. 𝛿1  and 𝛿2  are parameters of dummy 
variables in mean equation of market index. Thus, positive (negative) and significant 𝛿1(𝛿2) 
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means much public good (bad) information has a positive (negative) effect on the market 
cumulative returns in the same direction significantly. The estimation results show that both 
𝛿𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,1 and 𝛿𝑆&𝑝100,1 (𝛿𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,2 and 𝛿𝑆&𝑝100,2) are significantly positive (negative).  
 
[Table 5] Estimation results of DCC models: using cumulative returns 𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡 in mean equations 
(a) Market cumulative returns: DJIA and S&P 100 
 
Parameter 
μ 𝜃1 𝜃2 𝛿1 𝛿2 γ α β 
DJIA 
0.2147 
(0.0003) 
0.2415 
(0.0050) 
0.2054 
(0.0151) 
0.6922 
(0.0000) 
-0.9003 
(0.0000) 
0.1314 
(0.1048) 
0.3789 
(0.0007) 
0.5774 
(0.0000) 
S&P 
100 
0.2340 
(0.0051) 
0.3154 
(0.0000) 
0.1109 
(0.0446) 
0.9067 
(0.0000) 
-1.1068 
(0.0000) 
0.4615 
(0.1395) 
0.4769 
(0.0048) 
0.4057 
(0.0991) 
(b) Cumulative returns of DJIA components 
Ticker 
symbol 
Parameter 
 μ 𝜃1 𝜃2 γ α β 
MMM 0.1821(0.00) 0.4187(0.00) -0.1072(0.13) 0.9485(0.00) 0.6691(0.00) 0.1892(0.03) 
AXP 0.1656(0.05) 0.4000(0.00) -0.0832(0.19) 1.7088(0.00) 0.7309(0.00) 0.1371(0.19) 
T 0.0681(0.23) 0.2802(0.00) 0.0275(0.67) 0.9254(0.00) 0.7800(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
BA 0.1519(0.09) 0.2878(0.00) 0.0784(0.22) 1.6810(0.00) 0.6406(0.00) 0.1872(0.22) 
CAT 0.1056(0.34) 0.3510(0.00) 0.0259(0.84) 2.5015(0.09) 0.7188(0.00) 0.1250(0.65) 
CVX 0.2347(0.00) 0.4090(0.00) -0.0285(0.64) 0.7046(0.00) 0.5788(0.00) 0.3422(0.00) 
CSCO 0.1432(0.36) 0.3856(0.00) 0.0227(0.82) 1.4922(0.02) 0.3952(0.00) 0.4938(0.00) 
DD 0.0751(0.37) 0.3728(0.00) 0.0174(0.77) 0.6578(0.02) 0.5908(0.00) 0.3726(0.00) 
XOM 0.1343(0.02) 0.2506(0.00) 0.0544(0.49) 0.7771(0.00) 0.7274(0.00) 0.1466(0.19) 
GE 0.0650(0.48) 0.4131(0.00) -0.0376(0.64) 1.3798(0.00) 0.6842(0.00) 0.1850(0.14) 
GS 0.1326(0.28) 0.3937(0.00) -0.0920(0.09) 3.4266(0.00) 0.7162(0.00) 0.0112(0.92) 
HD 0.1871(0.01) 0.3924(0.00) -0.0416(0.50) 1.1693(0.00) 0.7941(0.00) 0.0885(0.22) 
INTC 0.0398(0.66) 0.3393(0.01) -0.0112(0.92) 1.9959(0.00) 0.8037(0.00) 0.0092(0.92) 
IBM 0.0807(0.33) 0.3948(0.00) -0.0371(0.42) 1.1104(0.00) 0.7516(0.00) 0.0763(0.48) 
JNJ 0.0457(0.28) 0.3629(0.00) -0.0608(0.51) 0.4487(0.00) 0.8413(0.00) 0.0291(0.72) 
JPM 0.0475(0.69) 0.3058(0.00) 0.0061(0.95) 2.0643(0.00) 0.6641(0.00) 0.2029(0.18) 
MCD 0.1934(0.00) 0.3529(0.00) -0.0676(0.50) 1.0322(0.00) 0.6323(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
MRK 0.0048(0.97) 0.3780(0.01) -0.0713(0.28) 1.4803(0.21) 0.7109(0.02) 0.0000(1.00) 
MSFT 0.1867(0.03) 0.3395(0.00) -0.0562(0.37) 1.8757(0.00) 0.7172(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
NKE 0.1249(0.63) 0.3216(0.15) -0.0118(0.96) 2.3502(0.18) 0.6877(0.02) 0.0000(1.00) 
PFE -0.0144(0.86) 0.2987(0.00) 0.0020(0.98) 1.4144(0.00) 0.7093(0.00) 0.0151(0.93) 
PG 0.0245(0.67) 0.2571(0.01) 0.0480(0.59) 0.7547(0.00) 0.7618(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
KO 0.0540(0.39) 0.3153(0.00) 0.0035(0.94) 0.8979(0.01) 0.7428(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
TRV 0.0400(0.55) 0.3538(0.00) -0.0703(0.35) 1.1076(0.00) 0.7776(0.00) 0.0283(0.69) 
UTX 0.1601(0.04) 0.3188(0.00) 0.0206(0.74) 1.2632(0.00) 0.7469(0.00) 0.1043(0.38) 
UNH 0.0910(0.28) 0.3270(0.00) -0.0269(0.76) 2.0935(0.00) 0.7294(0.00) 0.0697(0.41) 
VZ -0.0045(0.95) 0.3783(0.00) -0.0404(0.58) 1.0661(0.00) 0.7990(0.00) 0.0038(0.96) 
V 0.0884(0.40) 0.3085(0.00) -0.0520(0.44) 2.3105(0.00) 0.8376(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
WMT 0.1020(0.03) 0.0953(0.63) 0.1687(0.23) 0.8491(0.00) 0.7402(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
DIS 0.2001(0.01) 0.3351(0.00) -0.0018(0.97) 1.4950(0.00) 0.6768(0.00) 0.1357(0.45) 
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(c) Cumulative returns of S&P 100 components 
Ticker 
symbol 
Parameter 
μ 𝜃1 𝜃2 γ α β 
AAPL 0.1873(0.31) 0.3418(0.00) 0.0059(0.94) 2.8982(0.01) 0.8114(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
APC 0.0188(0.88) 0.3614(0.00) -0.0685(0.27) 4.3699(0.00) 0.7541(0.00) 0.0205(0.80) 
ABBV -0.1222(0.59) 0.5328(0.00) -0.2233(0.13) 4.9192(0.00) 0.6590(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
ABT 0.0623(0.25) 0.3006(0.00) 0.0036(0.95) 0.8957(0.00) 0.7750(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
ACN 0.0325(0.77) 0.4151(0.00) -0.0782(0.52) 1.5304(0.02) 0.8162(0.00) 0.1422(0.44) 
AXP 0.1656(0.05) 0.4000(0.00) -0.0832(0.19) 1.7087(0.00) 0.7309(0.00) 0.1372(0.19) 
AEP 0.0943(0.09) 0.3163(0.00) 0.0268(0.74) 0.7361(0.00) 0.6521(0.00) 0.1514(0.14) 
HON 0.1595(0.05) 0.3369(0.00) 0.0077(0.91) 0.9567(0.00) 0.6086(0.00) 0.3059(0.02) 
ALL 0.2160(0.01) 0.4079(0.00) -0.1141(0.12) 1.4824(0.00) 0.6459(0.00) 0.1691(0.11) 
AMGN -0.0203(0.80) 0.4263(0.00) -0.1257(0.09) 1.4149(0.00) 0.7150(0.00) 0.0858(0.41) 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
UPS 0.0943(0.14) 0.3604(0.00) -0.0348(0.65) 0.8023(0.00) 0.7521(0.00) 0.1438(0.06) 
USB 0.0846(0.26) 0.3010(0.00) 0.0050(0.95) 0.9295(0.00) 0.6665(0.00) 0.2724(0.01) 
UTX 0.1602(0.04) 0.3188(0.00) 0.0207(0.74) 1.2632(0.00) 0.7468(0.00) 0.1043(0.37) 
V 0.0790(0.40) 0.2666(0.00) -0.0170(0.83) 1.7801(0.00) 0.8637(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
VZ -0.0045(0.95) 0.3783(0.00) -0.0404(0.58) 1.0661(0.00) 0.7990(0.00) 0.0038(0.96) 
WAG 0.0733(0.46) 0.2720(0.02) 0.0097(0.93) 2.6603(0.00) 0.7012(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
WFC 0.0996(0.23) 0.2053(0.02) 0.0907(0.27) 1.2900(0.00) 0.7063(0.00) 0.2462(0.00) 
WMB 0.2236(0.10) 0.2975(0.00) 0.0969(0.42) 1.5216(0.19) 0.4804(0.02) 0.4358(0.12) 
WMT 0.1020(0.03) 0.0953(0.64) 0.1687(0.24) 0.8491(0.00) 0.7402(0.00) 0.0000(1.00) 
XOM 0.1343(0.02) 0.2506(0.00) 0.0545(0.49) 0.7772(0.00) 0.7275(0.00) 0.1466(0.19) 
* Notes: (1) Value in parentheses denotes p-value of t-test. 
       (2) DJIA and S&P 100 indices consist of 30 and 100 components respectively. In particular, we 
report only first 10 and last 10 components of S&P 100 index to save space９.  
       (3) All of the ticker symbols are extended in Appendix. 
 
[Figure 7] shows the conditional volatility of DJIA and S&P 100 index returns (upper left and 
lower left) and intensity of intentional herd behavior in DJIA and S&P 100 markets (upper right 
and lower right). It highlights that the conditional volatility of DJIA and S&P 100 index returns 
increased sharply at two periods and intentional herding also was exacerbated significantly in the 
same periods. The first period is ‘European sovereign debt crisis’ that is from end of 2009 to end 
of 2010, and the second period is ‘degradation of U.S. sovereign credit rating by Standard & 
Poor’s’ that is about half year since August 6th, 2011. It is worthwhile to note that negative events 
in markets, such as crisis, cause investors to have strong market-wide herding１０ and increase 
the conditional volatility considerably. That is, dynamic intentional herding can be regarded as a 
potential explanatory factor that drives the market volatility. This relationship is further analyzed 
formally in next sections. 
[Table 5] reports simple summary statistics of: (1) DJIA and S&P 100 index returns 
(𝑟𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡, 𝑟𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡), (2) cumulative returns in the same direction of DJIA and S&P 100 index  
                                           
９ The additional estimation results of other components are available from the author upon request. 
１０ This is consistent with the argument of Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000) and others. 
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(c𝑟𝑠𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡 , 𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡 ), (3) intensity of intentional herding in DJIA and S&P 100 markets 
(𝐷𝐻𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡, 𝐷𝐻𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡), and presents the correlation coefficient between 𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡 and conditional 
variance ℎ𝑚,𝑡. It should be noted that the range of 𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑚,𝑡 is greater than 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 (m=DJIA and 
S&P 100) and autocorrelation of 𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑚,𝑡 is much greater than 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 as a result of Ljung-Box Q 
test (at lag=5 and 10). 
We also turn to the joint test of autocorrelation in the herding series, 𝐷𝐻𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡, 𝐷𝐻𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡. The 
Ljung-Box Q statistics indicate an exceptionally high autocorrelation in the herding series and 
support that traders follow positive feedback trading strategy as a main factor of herd behavior, 
which should be serially correlated over time. 
 
[Figure 7] Conditional volatility (ℎ𝑚,𝑡
1/2
) and intentional herding 
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[Table 5] Summary statistic 
 𝑟𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡 𝑟𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡 𝑐𝑟𝑠𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡 𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡 𝐷𝐻𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡 𝐷𝐻𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡 
Min -5.7060 -6.3050  -6.9970  -11.2000  0.3513  0.3943  
1st Qu. -0.3925 -0.5182 -0.6802 -0.8437 0.4860 0.4567 
Median 0.0564 0.0952 0.1479 0.2212 0.5256 0.4846 
Mean 0.0433  0.0549  0.1654  0.2787  0.5335  0.4905  
3rd Qu. 0.5334 0.6882 1.1150 1.4850 0.5764 0.5207 
Max 4.1540  4.9150  7.1220  8.7720  0.6951  0.6310  
Std. Dev 1.0127 1.2085  1.8569  2.4425  0.0626  0.0462  
Skewness -0.4333 -0.2952  -0.2047  -0.2590  0.3305  0.4498  
Kurtosis 6.7021 5.6101  4.7974  5.2512  2.5120  2.7850  
Q(5) 
26.41 
(0.0000) 
13.65 
(0.0179) 
170.36 
(0.0000) 
245.27 
(0.0000) 
3321.50 
(0.0000) 
2935.9
0 
(0.000
0) 
Q(10) 
31.10 
(0.0006) 
17.75 
(0.0593) 
174.87 
(0.0000) 
248.28 
(0.0000) 
5465.30 
(0.0000) 
4633.7
0 
(0.000
0) 
Cor(𝐷𝐻𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡, ℎ𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡)  0.7382(0.0000)    
Cor(𝐷𝐻𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡, ℎ𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡 )     0.6524(0.0000)    
* Notes: Value in parentheses denotes p-value of in Ljung-Box Q(d.f.) test and Pearson’s 
correlation test 
 
2. Empirical Test for Intentional Herding 
In this section we implement the tests for market-wide intentional herding that address evidence 
for its dynamics and compare them with other tests such as CH and CCK that are pioneering 
works on this field. [Table 5] reports the means of 𝐷𝐻𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡 and 𝐷𝐻𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡 are 0.5335 and 
0.4905 respectively, and their standard deviations are 0.0626 and 0.0462 respectively. From (Eq. 
4), the test statistics 𝑍𝐷𝐻𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴  and 𝑍𝐷𝐻𝑆&𝑃100  under the null hypothesis of no intentional herding 
in markets are computed. Since the estimates are 0.5351 and -0.2056 by using the mean values of 
𝐷𝐻𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡 and 𝐷𝐻𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡, the null hypothesis of no intentional herding in both market indices is 
not rejected at the significant level of 5 percent. 
While the test results do not suggest statistical evidence of intentional herding over the period 
investigated, [Figure 7] depicts the fact that the values of 𝐷𝐻𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡and 𝐷𝐻𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡 in the periods 
of market stress exceed 0.5 obviously, which means the existence of intentional herd behavior. 
From the visual impression, it can be inferred that although there is no significant intentional 
herding in the whole period, intentional herding can significantly occur during the periods of 
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market stress. To verify this, it is necessary to run the tests at every time t. P-value of the test at 
the significant level of 5 percent is 0.6029 in terms of 𝐷𝐻𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴,𝑡  and 0.5028 in terms of 
𝐷𝐻𝑆&𝑃100,𝑡. According to the test results, interestingly we find that in both market indices the null 
hypothesis of no intentional herding is rejected on most of days included in the periods of market 
stress like European sovereign debt crisis and the degradation of U.S. sovereign credit rating by 
S&P, namely intentional herd behavior is expected to take place under extreme market conditions. 
This phenomenon is also confirmed by some previous studies such as Avramov et al. (2006). In 
addition, intentional herd behavior is more frequent in S&P 100 than DJIA, which is supported 
by the fact that significant intentional herd behavior has occurred for 138 days out of 858 days in 
DJIA but for 364 days out of 858 days in S&P 100.  
We now turn to perform the tests of CH and CCK. CH employed the following regression model 
to investigate whether the dispersion of returns (Cross-Sectional Standard Deviation, CSSD) is 
decreased significantly by during periods of extreme market movements: 
  𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
𝐿𝐷𝑡
𝐿 + 𝛽𝑈𝐷𝑡
𝑈 + 𝜀𝑡                    (Eq. 8) 
Christie and Huang (1995) suggest that in (Eq. 8), 𝐷𝑡
𝐿
(𝐷𝑡
𝑈) is a dummy variable which takes 
the value of 1 if the market returns at time t is positioned in the extreme lower(upper) tail of the 
distribution and the value of 0 otherwise, and 𝛼 is an intercept term. Thus, dummy variables can 
capture the differences between investor’s behavior in extreme market condition and normal 
market condition. 
Chang et al. (2000) argue that if market participants tend to follow market consensus during 
periods of large market price fluctuation, increasing and linear relation between individual stock 
return dispersions and market returns will become non-linearly increasing or even decreasing. On 
this intuition, they suggest the following regressions to examine whether the degree of herd 
behavior is asymmetric in rising (UP) and falling (DN) markets: 
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡
𝑈𝑃 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1
𝑈𝑃|𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝑈𝑃| + 𝛾2
𝑈𝑃(𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝑈𝑃)2 + 𝜀𝑡                (Eq. 9) 
    𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡
𝐷𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1
𝐷𝑁|𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝐷𝑁| + 𝛾2
𝐷𝑁(𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝐷𝑁)2 + 𝜀𝑡              (Eq. 10) 
In (Eq.s 9 and 10), |𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝑈𝑃|(|𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝐷𝑁|) is the absolute value of returns of all available securities 
on day t when the market is up(down). According to CCK, if during periods of extreme market 
conditions investors tend to herd toward the market, a negative non-linear relation between CSAD 
and the average market return should exist and be captured by the coefficient on the non-linear 
term. We implement the tests using DJIA and S&P 100 returns and the test results are reported in 
[Table 6]. 
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According to CSSD, statistically significant and negative coefficients may suggest that 
investors herd during extreme market conditions. By contrast, 𝛽𝐿  and 𝛽𝑈  are positive 
coefficient and statistically significant at 5% and 10% dummy criteria in DJIA and S&P 100 
indices. Furthermore, although negative 𝛾𝑈𝑃 and 𝛾𝐷𝑁 indicate herd behavior in CSAD, 𝛾𝑈𝑃 
and 𝛾𝐷𝑁 are positive in real market indices. It means, high return volatility has little effect on 
the intensity of herd behavior and its non-linear relationship cannot also be explained. Therefore, 
according to the results of [Table 6], there is not significant herd behavior in U.S. stock 
markets.１１  
 
[Table 6] Simple regression test results: CSSD and CSAD 
 
CSSD  CSAD 
Estimate  Estimate  
DJIA 
5% 
𝛼 0.9559 *** 𝛼𝑈𝑃 0.6513 *** 
𝛽𝐿 0.3295 *** 𝛾1
𝑈𝑃 0.0348  
𝛽𝑈 0.2866 *** 𝛾2
𝑈𝑃 0.0397 *** 
10% 
𝛼 0.9428 *** 𝛼𝐷𝑁 0.6306 *** 
𝛽𝐿 0.2260 *** 𝛾1
𝐷𝑁 0.0843 *** 
𝛽𝑈 0.2126 *** 𝛾2
𝐷𝑁 0.0170 ** 
S&P 100 
5% 
𝛼 1.2357 *** 𝛼𝑈𝑃 0.7824 *** 
𝛽𝐿 0.4538 *** 𝛾1
𝑈𝑃 0.1505 *** 
𝛽𝑈 0.5117 *** 𝛾2
𝑈𝑃 0.0099  
10% 
𝛼 1.2222 *** 𝛼𝐷𝑁 0.8241 *** 
𝛽𝐿 0.3388 *** 𝛾1
𝐷𝑁 0.1147 *** 
𝛽𝑈 0.2782 *** 𝛾2
𝐷𝑁 0.0161 * 
*Significant Codes: ‘ ∗∗∗ ’ for 0.01, ‘ ∗∗ ’ for 0.05, ‘ ∗ ’ for 0.1. 
 
In view of the earlier arguments concerning the drawbacks of CH and CCK, we should be 
cautious about interpreting the test results. Comparing them with our test results, in particular, we 
find that if it is failed to take into account the dynamic nature of herd behavior (i.e., the intensity 
of herd behavior varies over time significantly), we might draw a wrong evidence and tend to 
misinterpret it as not market-wide herding even during the periods of market stress. 
                                           
１１ The results are consistent with those documented by Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000). 
Especially, Chang et al. (2000) found the equity return dispersions tend to increase rather than decrease for 
the U.S., Hong Kong, and Japan during extreme price movements. They only found the herd behavior in 
South Korea and Taiwan during both extreme up and down price movement days. 
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3. The Effect of Intentional Herding on Volatility 
The question of whether herd behavior prevalent in financial markets drives markets fluctuated 
remarkably has been widely investigated in recent years. To substantiate this central issue１２, 
therefore, we estimate the (Eq. 14) regression model using quantile regression method that is a 
semiparametric approach (Koenker, 2005) and observe the effect of intentional herd behavior 
𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡  on a conditional volatility of market index returns from (Eq. 4) over the entire 
distribution１３. Indeed, the quantile regression method is ideal for examining the influence of 
intentional herding on volatility under different market conditions. 
In a simple regression model, 
                         𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
′β + 𝜀𝑖                           (Eq. 11) 
 
𝜏𝑡ℎ conditional quantile function of y given x can be determined as: 
 
𝑄𝑦(𝜏|𝑥) = 𝑥
′𝛽𝜏                         (Eq. 12) 
 
Quantile regression estimator ?̂?𝜏 can be solved from minimization problem of 𝜏
𝑡ℎ sample 
quantile. 
 
           ?̂?𝜏 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝛽∈𝑅𝑝 ∑ 𝜌𝜏(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
′β)𝑝𝑖=1               (Eq. 13) 
 
where 𝜌𝜏(a) = a(τ − I(a < 0)) is check function, τ ∈ (0,1), and I(·) is an indicator function 
which takes value of 1 if a < 0, and 0 otherwise.  
The quantile regression of an absolute value of market index returns is 
ℎ𝑚,𝑡
1/2(𝜏|𝑥) =  𝜔𝑚 + 𝜃𝑚𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡(𝜏) + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡            (Eq. 14) 
where ℎ𝑚,𝑡
1/2
 is a conditional volatility of market index return on day t as a simple estimate of 
volatility and 𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡 is our dynamic measure of intentional herd behavior. The estimation results 
for quantile regression are reported in [Table 7]. 
Extreme returns are located at the upper tail of the distribution of conditional volatility of 
market returns. Thus, somewhat similar in spirit to Chang et al. (2000), the influence of intentional 
herding on volatility during market stress periods can be naturally investigated by inspecting high 
quantiles such as τ = 0.90 and 0.95. According to the results in [Table 7], all estimates of the 
                                           
１２ Generally, given some motivations for herding such as informational cascades, we can expect that the 
intensity of intentional herding might affect the level of volatility. 
１３ According to Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000), we might observe herding during 
market stress and intuitively the quantile regression method is considerably valid in analyzing extreme 
quantiles of absolute returns and nonlinearity in the effect of herding. 
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𝜃 are positive and statistically significant for DJIA and S&P 100 indices. Moreover, as the value 
of τ  increases from 0.1 to 0.9, the value of 𝜃 also increases. It means, as markets become more 
turbulent, the level of positive relationship between intensity of intentional herding and market 
return volatility is also higher. Furthermore, in [Figure 8], all estimates of the 𝜃 for S&P 100 are 
always greater than DJIA. Thus, we document the higher level of the effect of intentional herd 
behavior on return volatility in S&P 100 index than DJIA index. 
 
[Table 7] Estimation results for quantile regression 
Market τ Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. Pr. ( > | t |) 
DJIA 
0.05 
𝜔𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 -1.1573  0.0740  0.0000   
𝜃𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 3.7031  0.1595  0.0000   
0.10 
𝜔𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 -1.1919  0.0860  0.0000  ** 
𝜃𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 3.8787  0.1745  0.0000  *** 
0.25 
𝜔𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 -1.6533  0.0747  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 5.0150  0.1616  0.0000  *** 
0.50 
𝜔𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 -2.2715  0.0669  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 6.5555  0.1475  0.0000  *** 
0.75 
𝜔𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 -2.4319  0.1765  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 7.3594  0.3558  0.0000  *** 
0.90 
𝜔𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 -2.9876  0.3338  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 9.0705  0.6726  0.0000  *** 
0.95 
𝜔𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 -3.7022  0.5761  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴 11.0177  1.1416  0.0000  *** 
S&P 100 
0.05 
𝜔𝑆&𝑃100 -0.8109  0.0957  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝑆&𝑃100 3.8173  0.2178  0.0000  *** 
0.10 
𝜔𝑆&𝑃100 -1.1597  0.1396  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝑆&𝑃100 4.6514  0.3128  0.0000  *** 
0.25 
𝜔𝑆&𝑃100 -2.0570  0.1042  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝑆&𝑃100 6.8099  0.2503  0.0000  *** 
0.50 
𝜔𝑆&𝑃100 -3.0051  0.2111  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝑆&𝑃100 9.2521  0.4567  0.0000  *** 
0.75 
𝜔𝑆&𝑃100 -3.6457  0.3325  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝑆&𝑃100 11.3630  0.7019  0.0000  *** 
0.90 
𝜔𝑆&𝑃100 -4.9614  0.5730  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝑆&𝑃100 15.0055  1.2420  0.0000  *** 
0.95 
𝜔𝑆&𝑃100 -6.3495  0.7742  0.0000  *** 
𝜃𝑆&𝑃100 18.7126  1.8175  0.0000  *** 
* Significant Codes: ‘ ∗∗∗ ’ for 0.01, ‘ ∗∗ ’ for 0.05, ‘ ∗ ’ for 0.1. 
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[Figure 8] Coefficients of quantile regression 
𝜔𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴                                 𝜔𝑆&𝑃100 
 
  𝜃𝐷𝐽𝐼𝐴                                 𝜃𝑆&𝑃100
 
 
 
Ⅴ. Concluding Remarks 
Most previous studies for detecting herd behavior have not distinguished intentional from 
spurious herding, but such distinction is a great challenge, as we can significantly distort the 
empirical results of herd behavior if we do not distinguish between them. This paper therefore 
suggests a new measure which accounts for market-wide intentional herding and additionally 
dynamic property. Our measure is derived from the DCC multivariate GARCH model of the 
cumulative returns in the same direction with the variable for the number of economic news 
announcements as a proxy of market information. Further, under the null hypothesis of no 
intentional herding we propose the test statistic of intentional herding at time t which follows 
standard normal distribution. 
We estimate the model by employing daily data from January 4th, 2010 to May 31st, 2013 for 
the main U.S. stock market indices (DJIA and S&P 100) and the stock prices of companies 
belonging to each index, and apply our measure to check its reliability and to investigate the 
existence of intentional herding in U.S. stock markets. The test results with respect to the CSSD 
and CSAD show the positive coefficients that are statistically significant by 5% and 10% dummy 
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criteria in DJIA and S&P 100 indices. Thus, both CSSD and CSAD cannot explain exactly the 
relationship between herd behavior and extreme market movements and suggest cannot reject the 
hypothesis of no intentional herding. Meanwhile, our empirical results provide clear evidence that 
intentional herding is more prevalent in the stress periods in which markets are highly volatile 
than the normal periods. This implies that the intensity of intentional herding varies with market 
conditions.  
We need to pay attention to the period of European sovereign debt crisis in which even though 
the news inflows are not so many, the markets are turbulent and the estimates of intentional herd 
behavior 𝐷𝐻𝑚,𝑡  are remarkably high because investor might follow others to suppress 
psychological stress induced by the crisis, especially this turbulence is more pronounced in terms 
of the cumulative returns. This interesting finding can provide insight into exactly why we 
frequently observe high volatility in financial markets even in the absence of any significant 
information or news including macroeconomic announcements and strongly supports that 
intentional herding causes high volatility１４.  
In addition, we estimate the quantile regression model using the dynamic herding measure to 
investigate whether intentional herd behavior makes extreme market fluctuation. According to 
the estimation results, the effect of intentional herding on market volatility tends to be stronger 
during the periods of turbulent markets like the degradation of U.S. sovereign credit rating by 
S&P and European sovereign debt crisis. Overall, since intentional herding is a crucial source of 
high volatility and increases the fragility of the financial system, this study demonstrates that 
dynamic intentional herding should be measured and considered seriously during the periods of 
market stress.       
 
  
                                           
１４  This is theoretically argued in the existing literature that is based on asset pricing models with 
heterogeneous beliefs (e.g., Brock and Hommes, 1998; Park, 2014). 
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Appendix. 
 
Ticker symbols for Dow Jones Industrial Average and Standard & Poor’s 100 Index 
 
AA Alcoa Incorporated 
AAPL Apple Incorporated 
APC Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 
ABBV AbbVie Incorporated 
ABT Abbott Laboratories 
ACN Accenture Plc. 
AXP American Express Company 
AEP American Electric Power Company Incorporated 
AVP Avon Products Incorporated 
HON Honeywell International Incorporated 
ALL Allstate Corporation 
AMGN Amgen Incorporated 
AMZN Amazon.com Incorporated 
APA Apache Corporation 
BA Boeing Corporation 
BAC Bank of America Corporation 
BAX Baxter International Incorporated 
BHI Baker Hughes Incorporated 
BK Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 
BMY Bristol-Myers Squibb Corporation 
BNI Burlington Northern Railroad 
BRK.B Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated 
C Citigroup Incorporated 
CAT Caterpillar Incorporated 
CL Colgate-Palmolive Company 
CMCSA Comcast Corporation 
COF Capital One Financial Corporation 
COP ConocoPhillips 
COST Costco Wholesale Corporation 
BPB Campbell Soup Company 
CSCO Cisco Systems Incorporated 
CVS CVS Health Corporation 
CVX Chevron Corporation 
DD E I Du Pont De Nemours And Company 
DELL Dell Incorporated 
DIS Walt Disney Company 
DOW Dow Chemical Company 
DVN Devon Energy Corporation 
EBAY eBay Incorporated 
EMC EMC Corporation 
EMR Emerson Electric Company 
ETR Entergy Corporation 
EXC Exelon Corporation 
F Ford Motor Company 
FCX Freeport-McMoRan Incorporated 
FDX FedEx Corporation 
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GD General Dynamics Corporation 
GE General Electric Company 
GILD Gilead Sciences Incorporated 
GOOGL Google Incorporated 
GS Goldman Sachs Group Incorporated 
HAL Halliburton Company 
HD Home Depot Incorporated 
HNZ H.J. Heinz Company 
HPQ Hewlett-Packard Company 
HSH Hillshire Brands Company 
IBM International Business Machines Corporation 
INTC Intel Corporation 
JNJ Johnson & Johnson 
JPM JPMorgan Chase & Company 
KFT Kraft Foods Incorporated 
KO The Coca-Cola Company 
MDLZ Mondelez international Incorporated 
LLY Eli Lilly and Company 
LMT Lockheed Martin Corporation 
LOW Lowe’s Companies Incorporated 
MA Mastercard Incorporated 
MCD McDonald’s Corporation 
MDT Medtronic Incorporated 
MMM 3M Company 
MO Altria Group Incorporated 
MON Monsanto Company 
MRK Merck & Company Incorporated 
MS Morgan Stanley 
MSFT Microsoft Corporation 
MET Metlife Incorporated 
NWSA News Corporation 
NKE Nike Incorporated 
NOV National-Oilwell Varco, Incorporated 
NSC Norfolk Southern Corporation 
NYX New York Stock Exchange Euronext 
ORCL Oracle Corporation 
OXY Occidental Petroleum Corporation 
PEP PepsiCo Incorporated 
PFE Pfizer Incorporated 
PG Procter & Gamble Company 
PM Philip Morris International Incorporated 
QCOM QUALCOMM Incorporated 
RF Regions Financial Corporation 
RTN Raytheon Company 
S Spring Nextel Corporation 
SBUX Starbucks Corporation 
SLB Schlumberger Limited 
SO Southern Company 
SPG Simon Property Group Incorporated 
T AT&T Incorporated 
TGT Target Corporation 
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TRV Travelers Companies Incorporated 
TWX Time Warner Incorporated 
TXN Texas Instruments Incorporated 
UNH UnitedHealth Group Incorporated 
UNP Union Pacific Corporation 
UPS United Parcel Service Incorporated 
USB U.S. Bancorp 
UTX United Technologies Corporation 
V Visa Incorporated 
VZ Verizon Communications Incorporated 
WAG Walgreen Company 
WFC Wells Fargo & Company 
WMB Williams Companies Incorporated 
WMT Wal-Mart Stores Incorporated 
WY Weyerhaeuser Company 
XOM Exxon Mobil Corporation 
XRX Xerox Corporation 
 
